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AGRUMENT 
POINT I 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT IS NOT CHALLENGING THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
A failure to marshal facts can only occur in an appeal 
that challenges the court's Findings of Fact. See, for example, 
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987) and many other similar 
cases. 
The Defendant challenges only the court's discretionary 
rulings. Consequently, the standard of review is "abuse of 
discretion" and not "clearly erroneous" as is incorrectly claimed 
on page 2 of the Brief of Appellee. See generally JACKSON, Utah 
Standards of Appellate Review, UTAH BAR JOURNAL, Vol. 7, No. 8, 
at 24-26, (1994) and the many cases cited therein. Consequently, 
failure to marshal evidence is not an issue in this appeal. 
POINT II 
IN DETERMINING THE RECEIVING SPOUSE'S STANDARD OF LIVING, 
BOTH "NEEDS" AND "FINANCIAL CONDITION" MUST BE CONSIDERED 
Standard of Living 
In the Statement of Facts of the Brief of Appellee, the 
Plaintiff tries to paint a misleading picture of the Defendant's 
standard of living. The Defendant does "own" a motor home; 
1 
however, he owes more than it is worth. (Transcript pages 72 and 
73.) The Defendant does not live in a condominium; he rents part 
of a duplex. (Transcript page 79.) The Defendant does take 
trips as stated; however, they are in his motor home and, in 
addition, for his 50th birthday he did take a trip to Hawaii. 
(Transcript page 81.) 
This is not the standard of living of a wealthy person. 
His standard appears to be that of an average working person. 
The Plaintiff claimed to seek a similar standard of living at the 
hearing. 
The courts have repeatedly affirmed that a function of 
alimony is to provide support for the receiving spouse as nearly 
as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the parties' 
marriage. See Breinholt v. Breinholt, 905 P.2d 877, 879 (Utah 
App. 1995), and the cases cited therein. This is also now 
statutorily mandated. Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended. 
There are two elements of standard of living, i.e., 
"needs" and "financial condition". They both should be 
considered in setting alimony. The Plaintiff in the Brief of 
Appellee wants the court to only look at "needs". 
Needs 
In the Plaintiff's Financial Declaration (attached to 
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the Brief of Appellant), the Plaintiff included, among other 
expenses, the following expenses: 
a. Maintenance (residence) $207.14, 
b. Clothing 186.00t 
c. Incidentals 170.66, 
d. Auto expense 167.71; and 
e. Auto payments 242.96, 
all of which appear to be typical expenses of an average working 
person. 
The Plaintiff at the hearing asked the court to help 
her with these expenses necessary for her to maintain her prior 
standard of living. All of those expenses or "needs" were 
accounted for and accepted when Judge Peuler used the Plaintiff's 
own Financial Declaration to determine the Plaintiff's needs. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, August 5, 1996, 
paragraph 7.) 
The needs element of standard of living was met exactly 
as the Plaintiff requested. However, there are two elements of 
standard of living and the second element, "financial condition", 
was not considered by Judge Peuler. 
Financial Condition 
The trial court should have gone further and considered 
the receiving spouse's financial condition. Breinholt, at 879. 
Instead, the trial court abused its discretion and found that it 
would be speculative to consider the Plaintiff's $70,600.00 of 
equity in her house. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
August 5, 1996, paragraph 16.) A closer look at the testimony at 
the hearing demonstrates the court's abuse of its discretionary 
powers. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff at the hearing was that 
she had just gotten a loan to finance her car. She stated 
further, that although she had considered a loan to refinance her 
house, she had not yet looked into it. (Transcript page 59.) 
Further questioning drew out that the plaintiff did not then know 
how she would pay for a loan. (Transcript page 60.) However, 
the questions did not change her statement that she had "not yet" 
looked into a refinance of $70,600.00 of equity. 
In the Brief of Appellee, the Plaintiff argues against 
considering financial condition. The Plaintiff argues that net 
equity is meaningless unless the home is sold. The Plaintiff 
goes on to create a straw man argument wherein it is claimed that 
the Defendant did not present evidence of how the Plaintiff could 
obtain a "second mortgage" and etc. The questions at the hearing 
did not address a "second mortgage", which is the adding of 
additional debt. The questions at the hearing addressed 
"refinancing", which is the use of the equity and cancellation of 
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the original debt. A "second mortgage" was not at issue. 
The questions at the hearing dealt with whether the 
Plaintiff had done anything to use her $70,600.00 of equity to 
improve her position. This equity is a critical element of her 
financial condition. She should not be allowed to accumulate 
wealth, i.e., equity in her house, and at the same time assert 
that she "needs" more money from the Defendant in order to 
improve her standard of living. 
The court abused its discretion by shutting its eyes to 
the $70,600.00 of equity in the Plaintiff's house and by refusing 
to consider the Plaintiff's $80,000.00 net worth. The Plaintiff 
is in excellent financial condition. That conclusion is not 
speculative. It is obvious. The court refused to consider an 
essential element of standard of living, i.e., the Plaintiff's 
excellent "financial condition." 
The Plaintiff's argument that the Defendant failed to 
present evidence of the effects of refinancing leaves the 
Defendant in a "catch 22" situation. Had the Defendant brought 
in an expert witness to testify regarding how the house might be 
refinanced, then the Plaintiff would have objected and claimed 
that the expert's testimony was nothing but speculation. 
Consequently, the Defendant only asked, "Have you ever looked 
into getting a loan to refinance your house, ..." The 
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Plaintiff's reply was, "Not yet." (Transcript page 59.) For the 
Defendant to do more would have been cause for Plaintiff's 
objections. 
$300.00 Bonus 
The Brief of Appellee skirts around the $300.00 per 
month that the court awarded the Plaintiff in excess of her 
claimed needs. The Plaintiff's brief went to great pains to 
itemize all of the help the Plaintiff has asked for from various 
sources. The Brief of Appellee ignores the fact that all of 
these things were eliminated by the "needs" listed and accepted 
in her Financial Declaration. 
The court found specifically that the Plaintiff's 
ability to produce income when added to her child support left 
her $250.00 per month short of her expense needs. (Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, August 5, 1996, paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 
and 7.) The court then abused its discretion by awarding the 
$250.00 "needs" shortfall, plus a $300.00 per month bonus. 
The court then went on and refused to look at the 
Plaintiff's "financial condition", which was excellent. When her 
available equity and net worth are considered, then her standard 
of living exceeded that of the Defendant. However, the court 
should not have even awarded the $250.00 per month. For example, 
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the Plaintiff's claimed house maintenance expense was $207.14. 
That expense and others should have been met by the Plaintiff's 
available equity and net worth. They are a part of her overall 
financial condition. For the court to not so decide was a 
further abuse of discretion. 
(NOTE: This failure to consider "financial condition" also 
affects the trial court's attorney's fee decision as discussed in 
the Brief of Appellant.) 
POINT III 
THERE WAS AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION SUPPORTED 
BY CONSIDERATION AND CONFIRMED BY THE PARTIES' ACTIONS 
In the Brief of Appellee, the Plaintiff states, "there 
is a total lack of any type of consideration." This statement is 
not supported by the facts elicited at the hearing and identified 
in the Brief of Appellant. The Defendant's consideration was to 
continue health care coverage, to forgo an immediate petition to 
the court, and to continue to pay alimony. There is no lack of 
consideration for this Accord and Satisfaction. 
Likewise, the Brief of Appellee ignores the law that a 
meeting of the minds may be proved by actions and conduct. 
Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Utah 1943). This is 
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misguided. The standard of review in determining if a contract 
exists is correction of error, no particular deference being 
given to the trial court's ruling. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., v. 
Ouintek, Inc., 834 P.2d 582 (Utah App. 1992). 
The Plaintiff may have produced a self-serving set of 
notes from a call to the Defendant on March 18, 1995. However, 
that flies in the face of what the parties had done since 
October, 1994. The Defendant did as agreed and the Plaintiff 
accepted the benefits of the agreement. The appellate court 
should look at the parties' actions and conclude a contract was 
created, as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The correct standard of review is "abuse of discretion" 
in alimony cases and not "clearly erroneous". The Defendant is 
not challenging the court's Findings of Fact, only its 
Conclusions. 
In order to examine standard of living, the court had 
to look at both "needs" and "financial condition" of the 
receiving spouse. The court failed to do this. Instead, the 
court awarded the Plaintiff's claimed needs, added on a $300.00 
per month bonus and refused to reduce alimony even though the 
Plaintiff's financial condit ion was excellent. This excellent 
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financial condition also requires the court to not award the 
Plaintiff any attorney's fee. 
Finally, actions speak louder than words and the court 
should have found an accord and satisfaction based upon the 
parties' actions. Alimony would have then terminated in April, 
1995. 
/</>Ju 
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